After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents

arXiv:2610.28425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the attacker leaves, threats we term carryover attacks. Existing prompt-injection benchmarks evaluate attacks only in the session where malicious content is first observed, leaving the gate governing when and how often a planted payload later re-fires unmeas

This content is for informational purposes only and is not professional advice. Specifications, prices, plan tiers, and features change frequently and may differ from what is shown here; verify current details on the manufacturer's or company's official page before purchasing. Ratings are based on analysis of published documentation, not independent lab testing.