Can You Trust Your Preference Models? Stackelberg Games for Alignment

arXiv:2610.15008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models are frequently aligned to human preferences via imperfect evaluators whose errors can be exploited during optimization. We train policies to search for comparisons on which an evaluator may reverse the underlying preference, providing candidates for additional supervision. Since human preferences are unavailable during policy training, we use disagreement among an ensemble of preference models as a proxy for prediction error. We formulate this search as a zero-sum Stackelberg game between two opposing policies, a Leader which trie

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