arXiv: cs.AI preprintsInternational6 November 2026
Polynomial-Time Computation of Extensive-Form Proper Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
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arXiv:2611.07089v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact extensive-form proper equilibrium in a finite two-player zero-sum extensive-form game with perfect recall and rational data. Properness is understood in the agent normal form: an action at an information set is penalized relative to a better action while all other local behavioral choices, including the player's own future actions, remain fixed. Our algorithm assigns each information set a geometric permutahedron of allowable action probabilities. A scaled doubly stochasti
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