Robust Nash Alignment under Preference Uncertainty

arXiv:2610.00715v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Preference-based alignment methods typically optimize against a single preference model, and can therefore be brittle when pairwise preferences are uncertain: noisy, heterogeneous, or shift after deployment. To address these issues, we propose Robust Nash Alignment, a game-theoretic framework for alignment to uncertain pairwise preferences. Our formulation has a major learner seeking a policy with a large worst-case win rate against both an adversarial competitor and any preference kernel lying in an ambiguity set around a nominal preference. Whe

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