arXiv: cs.AI preprintsInternational6 November 2026
SPILLWAY: Separating Target Admission from Sanitization to Defend Tool-Using Agents against Prompt Injection
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arXiv:2611.07222v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using agents act on email, files, and payments, so an instruction hidden in a web page or a shared document can make an agent send data or money to an attacker. Many runtime defenses put a language model on the decision that lets an action through, so the decision depends on a model that may read the attacker's text and adds model calls to every step. Provenance defenses keep the model off the final check but need a model to plan or route each task first. Where an action goes can instead be read from the tools' typed returns: an email's se
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