arXiv: cs.AI preprintsInternational6 November 2026
When Imperfect Automated Fact-Checking Backfires: Social Learning in the Presence of Misinformation
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arXiv:2611.08053v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Automated fact-checking tools, cheap and fast but imperfect, are increasingly available on social platforms. We study when such tools can backfire in a sequential social learning model of misinformation. Agents observe an article's reliability and their predecessors' actions, which indicate whether they liked or disliked the article. They may also pay to fact-check it. We examine how welfare, defined as the probability of a correct cascade, changes when a free, error-prone automated tool supplements costly but perfectly accurate manual fact-check
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