arXiv — cs.AI preprintsInternational5 October 2026
Will the User Ever Know? Covert Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents
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arXiv:2608.30362v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Success Rate (ASR), counts whether an injection succeeds but ignores what the user notices in the agent's final response. Looking at successful injection traces, we find two distinct outcomes: the agent executes the injection while returning an otherwise normal response, or reports the injected action in its final response, giving the user a chance to notice. We call these covert and overt successes
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